}

An Official Response to Goldstone

It’s about time, no?

The Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, (the “Malam”), headed by Colonel (Res). Reuven Erlich, has released a 500 page report refuting the Goldstone Report. In a summary published in the Jerusalem Post, the report is described to mostly focus on Hamas’ activities during Operation Cast Lead, including its use of humanitarian and/or civilian structures, such as “mosques, hospitals, ambulances and schools,” as shields and launch sites. For example, over 100 mosques and hospitals were used as Kassam launch sites. A video, also, shows the use of children as human shields by Hamas.

Rather than tell you all about it, and give you my opinion on it (since I don’t really have time to read and fully analyze it at present), you can find the English version of the document here.  Below is the table of contents:

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: Main Findings I

2. Part One: An examination of how the Goldstone Report relates to Hamas and the terrorist threat to Israel from the Gaza Strip before Operation Cast Lead 1

Section I –The historical-security context of Operation Cast Lead 10

Section II – The nature of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in and from the Gaza Strip 13

Section III – Hamas-governmental support for terrorism: the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip 32

Section IV – The Hamas-led military buildup in the Gaza Strip 45

Section V – The increase in terrorism from the Gaza Strip and the events leading to Operation Cast Lead 56

Section VI – Rocket and mortar shell fire during and after Operation Cast Lead 95

Section VII– External support for terrorism: Iran and Syria support the buildup of the military infrastructures 103

3. Part Two: The Use of Civilians in the Gaza Strip as Human Shields during Operation Cast Lead 108

Main Findings 110

Section I – Hamas’ combat doctrine for urban areas and its implementation in Operation Cast Lead 117

Section II – Hamas’ military use of public and administrative institutions and facilities during Operation Cast Lead 143

Section III – Hamas’ combat tactics of fighting in densely-populated areas during Operation Cast Lead 195

4. Part Three: Integrating the Hamas police and internal security services in military-terrorist activity both routinely and during Operation Cast Lead 262

Main Findings 265

Section I – Integrating the police and other internal security services into the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades 268

Section II – Cooperation between the police, other internal security services and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades during Operation Cast Lead 288

Section III – Police and other internal security operatives with double identities killed during and after Operation Cast Lead 297

Section IV – Sayid Siyyam as a case study: Portrait of the interior and national security minister of the de facto Hamas administration, killed by the IDF in Operation Cast Lead, an example of the double identities of senior security figures 309

5. Appendix I: Analysis of the Ratio between the Military Operative and Civilian Casualties

during Operation Cast Lead 312

Section I: Main findings of a statistical study carried out by the Israeli defense establishment compared with data from Hamas and Palestinian NGOs in the Gaza Strip 315

Section II: Reasons for the statistical divergences 317

Section III: Operation Cast Lead vs. Other Areas of Asymmetric Warfare 323

6. Appendix II: A selection of Intelligence and 325

Terrorism Information Center Bulletins Issued in recent years on issues relevant to the

Goldstone Report Overview 325

Links to Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Bulletins on key issues 326

The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and its significance 326

Hamas’ essential nature and its military buildup 327

The Gaza Strip as focal point for anti-Israeli terrorist activity 327

The lull in the fighting and its unilateral termination by Hamas and subsequent deliberate escalation (June –December, 2008) 330

Using the civilian population as a human shields 331

The military use of administrative and public buildings 332

The police and other internal security services integrated with Hamas’ military terrorist wing 333

Palestinian Casualties during Operation Cast Lead 334

Documents Containing Basic Relevant Information 334

Serial publications 335

Table of Contents
Page
1. Introduction: Main Findings I
2. Part One: An examination of how the
Goldstone Report relates to Hamas and the
terrorist threat to Israel from the Gaza Strip
before Operation Cast Lead
1
Section I –The historical-security context of
Operation Cast Lead
10
Section II – The nature of Hamas and the
other terrorist organizations operating in and
from the Gaza Strip
13
Section III – Hamas-governmental support
for terrorism: the de facto Hamas
administration in the Gaza Strip
32
Section IV – The Hamas-led military buildup
in the Gaza Strip
45
Section V – The increase in terrorism from the
Gaza Strip and the events leading to Operation
Cast Lead
56
Section VI – Rocket and mortar shell fire
during and after Operation Cast Lead
95
Section VII– External support for terrorism:
Iran and Syria support the buildup of the
military infrastructures
103
3. Part Two: The Use of Civilians in the Gaza
Strip as Human Shields during Operation Cast
Lead
108
Main Findings 110
Section I – Hamas’ combat doctrine for urban
areas and its implementation in Operation Cast
Lead
117
Section II – Hamas’ military use of public and
administrative institutions and facilities during
Operation Cast Lead
143
Section III – Hamas’ combat tactics of 195
XIII
fighting in densely-populated areas during
Operation Cast Lead
4. Part Three: Integrating the Hamas police and
internal security services in military-terrorist
activity both routinely and during Operation
Cast Lead
262
Main Findings 265
Section I – Integrating the police and other
internal security services into the Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Brigades
268
Section II – Cooperation between the police,
other internal security services and the Izz al-
Din al-Qassam Brigades during Operation Cast
Lead
288
Section III – Police and other internal security
operatives with double identities killed during
and after Operation Cast Lead
297
Section IV – Sayid Siyyam as a case study:
Portrait of the interior and national security
minister of the de facto Hamas administration,
killed by the IDF in Operation Cast Lead, an
example of the double identities of senior
security figures
309
5. Appendix I: Analysis of the Ratio between
the Military Operative and Civilian Casualties
during Operation Cast Lead
312
Section I: Main findings of a statistical study
carried out by the Israeli defense establishment
compared with data from Hamas and
Palestinian NGOs in the Gaza Strip
315
Section II: Reasons for the statistical
divergences
317
Section III: Operation Cast Lead vs. Other
Areas of Asymmetric Warfare
323
6. Appendix II: A selection of Intelligence and 325
XIV
Terrorism Information Center Bulletins Issued
in recent years on issues relevant to the
Goldstone Report
Overview 325
Links to Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center Bulletins on key
issues
326
ï‚· The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip
and its significance
326
 Hamas’ essential nature and its
military buildup
327
ï‚· The Gaza Strip as focal point for anti-
Israeli terrorist activity
327
ï‚· The lull in the fighting and its
unilateral termination by Hamas and
subsequent deliberate escalation (June –
December, 2008)
330
ï‚· Using the civilian population as a
human shields
331
ï‚· The military use of administrative and
public buildings
332
ï‚· The police and other internal security
services integrated with Hamas’ militaryterrorist
wing
333
ï‚· Palestinian Casualties during
Operation Cast Lead
334
ï‚· Documents Containing Basic Relevant
Information
334
ï‚· Serial publications 335

Latest posts by dahlia (see all)

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

melbet зеркало мелбет регистрация
%d bloggers like this: